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CREWMEMBER AGREEMENT INVALID WHEN SIGNED BY PERSON OTHER THAN MASTER

46 U.S.C.

§ 10601 unambiguously requires that fishing agreements with

each seaman

contain certain substantive provisions, including a concrete requirement that the vessel
master sign the agreement.

Harper v. United States Seafoods L.P.
278 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 2002)
(Decided January 29, 2002, cert. denied 154 L.Ed. 2d 134, 123 S.Ct. 79, 2002 U.S. LEXIS
6444(2002))

On January 11, 2000, Joe Harper ("Harper") signed a contract with United States
Seafoods, L.P. ("United States Seafoods"), to work as a processor aboard its fishing vessel "the
Sea freeze."

The employment agreement was signed, on behalf of the employer, by the

company's recruiting and hiring agent in Seattle. The vessel's master did not sign this contract.

Harper completed his contractual duties with United States Seafoods on April 28, 2000.
Thereafter, United States Seafoods paid Harper per the terms under his contract.

However,

Harper filed suit alleging that the contract itself was invalid, because it did not meet the specific
requirements outlined under 46 U.S.C. § 10601, and that he was entitled to additional wages, to
be calculated by awarding the highest rate of pay for seamen of similar rating out of the same port
of hire under 46 U.S.C. § 11107. This action was filed against United States Seafoods in
personam,

and against the vessel "the Seafreeze" in rem, claiming that the employment contract

was defective.

Harper moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of the validity of the
employment contract with United States Foods. Relying on the unambiguous, plain meaning of
46 U.S.C. § 10601 in granting the motion, the district court held that the contract was invalid
because the statute required the ship's master to sign the employment agreement. United States
Seafoods then filed an interlocutory appeal, which represents the instant issue before the Court.
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orders are not appealable, but 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a)(3) creates an exception to the final judgment
rule for orders determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases.").
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The Court, reviewing de novo, stated that to affirm a grant of summary judgment the
question becomes one of pure statutory interpretation.

The Court affirmed, holding that 46

U.S.C. § 10601, relating to employment agreements for fishing vessels, clearly requires the
master's signature in order to make the agreement valid.

In evaluating the statute, the Court

conducted a three-tier interpretation including historical backdrop, language, and comparison
with additional admiralty statutes.

The Court took into account all prior statutory provisions related to § 1060 1. It noted that
statutory protection of the seafarer's right to a written contract dates back to one of the first acts
of Congress. Cases under such predecessor acts refer to the master's signature, suggesting that a
similar interpretation of the successor statute § 10601 is consistent with the historical
interpretation. The Court further concluded that the requirement of the master's signature was
assumed necessary in prior case law under these predecessor acts. United States v. Atkins, 24
F.Cas. 885 (D. Mass. 1856); Crowell v. United States, 6 F.Cas. 912, 9 13 (C.C. Mass. 1856).

The text of § 10601 was then examined. The Court considered the language of the statute
to be clear and unambiguous, thereby making the text controlling. The requirement in § 10601(a)
that the master and the seamen "make a fishing agreement in writing" clearly requires both
parties to sign the agreement. The Court noted that the statute's second paragraph required that
"the agreement shall be signed also by the owner of the vessel." 46 U.S.C § 10601(b). The Court
reasoned that to give "also" effect in subsection (b), it must be concluded that subsection (a)
imposes a signing requirement of the master and seaman. The Court held that this interpretation
of the statute was neither absurd nor impracticable and that such a requirement, that the contract
bear both the signatures of master and owner, is neither unwieldy nor unworkable.

United States Seafoods argued that § 1060 1 should be read only to require the
fisherman's, and not the master's, signature. This strained reading of the statute was rejected.
United States Seafoods also argued that such "technical deficiencies" should not be considered as
a breach of the statute. The Court interpreted this as an argument for the excuse of a violation
under § 10601 where there has been "substantial compliance." The Court, after noting that the
Ninth Circuit has frequently rejected substantial compliance arguments, rejects the argument here
as well, arguing that the master did nothing even arguably equivalent to signing the contract to
raise a valid substantial compliance argument.
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